New Threats to Freedom
NEW THREATS TO FREEDOM

Edited and Introduced by
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Introduction

Where Have All the Grown-ups Gone?

Adam Bellow

On June 8, 1978, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn accepted an honorary degree from Harvard University. I happened to be sitting in the audience watching a friend graduate when he delivered his famous commencement address, “A World Split Apart.” The writer had come down for the occasion from his house in a remote part of Vermont—an exile within an exile that served to insulate him from the temptations and distractions of his adopted society.

My father also had a house in Vermont and spent the summers there in self-imposed seclusion with his manuscripts and books. For many years there was no television, and the paper often came a day late. Long walks in the woods and conversations in the overgrown garden were the only entertainment. In general I understood the need for this kind of artistic withdrawal. But Solzhenitsyn’s was much more severe, and it hinted at an ascetic strain that seemed distinctly foreign to our open, confessional culture.

Some commentators felt that he should have embraced his new home and become a proper American, cheerfully making the rounds of talk shows and going to baseball games. After the Harvard speech, a lot of these people probably wished he had stayed home.

“The Western world has lost its civil courage,” Solzhenitsyn declared in a tinny, far-off voice one strained to hear across the sea of folding chairs. It was a hot and humid day in Harvard Yard, and the graduates sat sweltering in their black commencement garb as the
stern chronicler of the Soviet gulag, speaking in Russian with the aid of a translator, bitterly attacked them, along with their parents, teachers, political leaders, and pretty much the whole Western world. Solzhenitsyn accused the West of blind arrogance, of material abundance coupled with spiritual poverty. Acknowledging the wealth and security provided by the capitalist welfare states, he warned that such security would be addictive and enervating. He dourly indicted the mendacity of the press, the decadence of art, the mediocrity of our leaders, and the broad conformity of opinion imposed more by fashion than censorship. Sounding a lot like someone else I knew—my dad—he spoke of the “revolting invasion of publicity . . . TV stupor . . . intolerable music.”

Worst of all, the gift of freedom had been abused and debased in the West: “Destructive and irresponsible freedom has been granted boundless space.” This perversion of the doctrine of rights had grown out of a benevolent humanism whose hallmark was the denial of evil. But evil did exist and in fact had grown stronger as we grew weaker. “Facing such a danger, with such historical values in your past, at such a high level of realization of freedom and apparently of devotion to freedom, how is it possible to lose to such an extent the will to defend oneself?”

Few of the privileged elite in attendance that day could have guessed that they would be seized roughly by the neck and have their faces rubbed in the dirt by this distinguished foreign visitor. Instead of the flattery and thanks they undoubtedly thought they deserved for inviting him there in the first place, he delivered a deadly blow to the *amour-propre* of the Harvard establishment.

As for me, I squirmed a little uncomfortably in my seat as the indictment rolled on. I had been up late the night before and was a bit hung over from too much drinking and partying. Part of me was decidedly irked at having to listen to yet another Nobel Prize–winning writer declaim against the shallowness and superficiality of my generation. Surely I got enough of this at home. But part of me respected what he had to say and knew he had a point. We were less serious than our fathers’ generation. That’s why it was good to have
these cranky old codgers around to bang on about freedom and tyranny.

Thirty years later I sat in exactly the same spot, proudly watching my own daughter graduate, listening to Energy Secretary Steven Chu trying to enlist the Class of 2009 in the Obama administration's fight for conservation and sustainable energy. I understood, of course, that young people long to be enlisted in the service of higher ideals and that concern about global climate change has become the test of moral seriousness for this generation. I had nothing against the pursuit of these goals and I admired the willingness of my daughter and her friends to take personal responsibility for saving the planet. But I couldn't help observing that in raising their sights so much higher, they were expressing a certain blithe assurance about the permanence of freedom. Growing up in a world where the Cold War was a distant memory, they took it even more for granted than we had.

I also couldn't help reflecting on the abrupt disappearance of the discourse about freedom and democracy that had preoccupied the noblest minds of the twentieth century. As the son of a writer much concerned with these grand themes, I had grown up at the margins of this high-flown international debate and was familiar with its cast of characters and basic vocabulary. The destiny of man, the needs of the soul, the fate of free societies—this was heady stuff to hear debated at the dinner table or over the morning paper, mixed in with Jewish jokes and family gossip. But for me it defined what it meant to be a serious person.

Who offers such warnings today? Which writers and intellectuals have taken upon themselves the defense of freedom on a high moral plane? Where have all the grown-ups gone? Those of us who came of age during those years might be forgiven for asking this question.

Of course, the older generation had an advantage we do not (if one can really call it that)—namely an acquaintance with history. For them the Cold War was a mesmerizing drama, a globe-spanning confrontation between freedom and tyranny. To keep a distracted public focused on these issues, they held conferences, gave interviews, edited magazines, wrote articles and books, and testified before
congressional committees. Mere words, one might say. (“What did you do during the Cold War, Daddy?” “I edited Commentary.”) But words matter when the war is, at bottom, a war of ideas.

Many of us assumed that there would always be such people on hand to make the case for freedom and democracy. The loss of many of these outsized intellectual and literary figures in the first decade of this century leaves one wondering whether there are still any grown-ups around.

But here is a sobering thought: merely to ask the question is to assume responsibility for embracing the task oneself. Resistance doesn’t come out of nowhere; it has to be fostered the old-fashioned way, word by word, through magazines and books, think-tank panels, conferences, and seminars. We are the grown-ups now, and we owe it to the next generation to provide a model of how to be serious about ultimate questions. This collection is a tentative first step in that direction.

First, however, a few disclaimers are in order.

This is not your father’s Cold War anthology. The Soviet Union is gone, the captive nations are free, and the imminent threat of nuclear extinction has retreated. To be sure, some of the old threats remain, in different forms. Thus, the specter of Islamic totalitarianism has replaced those of fascism and communism. We have also recently been reminded how much of our personal freedom depends on economic prosperity. But on the whole we are remarkably free from external threats of the kind that characterized most of the twentieth century.

The contributors to this volume have steered away as much as possible from the drumbeat of current events and tried to focus their gaze on the field of emerging threats, or on current challenges to freedom that seem likely to endure. There is some criticism of the present administration, though not in a partisan spirit but from the perspective of its commitment to promoting freedom around the world.

The result is very far from comprehensive. Indeed, in making our assignments, my Templeton colleagues and I have eschewed a
systematic plan and trusted in the passion and conviction of our authors—and believe me, they are passionate. To read these essays one after another is to enter a series of highly individual worlds of emphatic and intelligent concern. Each of these authors has thought deeply about his or her chosen subject and has approached it in a very personal and sometimes idiosyncratic fashion. No doubt we have overlooked important aspects of the subject; I can think of a number of topics not covered here. But this collection makes no claim to be exhaustive. Instead it is a modest attempt to revive a discourse about freedom that has gone out of fashion and to foster a proper attitude of resistance to the forces that threaten it.

Every generation has to meet this challenge, and it is primarily an intellectual one: resistance (for that is the point of this exercise) necessarily begins with an effort to grasp and define the precise nature of the threats we confront. For it is the essence of self-government that we must, as individuals, make sense of the world we inhabit, even as it changes dramatically from decade to decade.

Introducing such a volume is a daunting task, and I hope I may be excused from the usual reflections on the nature and meaning of freedom. My role as editor is not to define what freedom is or plumb its philosophical depths. What I can say is that as a result of assigning and editing these essays, I have concluded that in our time, threats to freedom are much less visible and obvious than they were in the twentieth century and may even appear in the guise of social and political progress. Another way of putting this is to say that the greatest threats to freedom have migrated from the external to the internal. They still exist outside of us, but their power to limit our freedom often depends upon our failure or reluctance to notice them.

This book tries to make us aware of these new threats and addresses how they affect us both collectively and as individuals, for the defense of freedom (today more than ever) is the job of the individual. Especially in the absence of outstanding figures like Solzhenitsyn, whose personal sufferings conferred both the duty and the authority to speak of such things, we are now more or less on our
own. Each of us must therefore accept responsibility for confronting the new threats to freedom, which are on the whole much more insidious than they were a few decades ago. As such, they require not only extra vigilance on our part, but a real effort even to see that they exist.

Another anecdote may illustrate this point.

A few years after Solzhenitsyn’s Harvard speech, I happened to be walking through Soho, then in its infancy as New York’s fashionable art district, and came across an unusual installation that occupied a large display window on lower Broadway. The window (easily twelve feet across and six feet high) contained what looked like a large classical edifice in ruins—broken columns, heaps of rubble, the remains of a marble façade slowly effaced by the passage of time. Affixed to the columns were yellowed bits of parchment containing fragments of flowing script which I instantly recognized as phrases from the U.S. Constitution.

It was then that I noticed the movement of thousands of ants, busily swarming up and down the columns and poking about in the rubble. Suddenly the point came home to me: America was like a great and noble edifice constructed by giants who had long since disappeared. We who remained had dwindled in size to the point where we could not even see what they had built, let alone read and comprehend their founding documents. Instead we crawled around in the ruins looking for food.

This visual tableau, which I am tempted to call “Swiftian” for the way it used differences in physical size to symbolize diminished moral stature, perfectly embodied Solzhenitsyn’s observation that human characters in the West had been weakened, hollowed out, and in effect made less interesting by decades of security and comfort.

Luckily for us, Solzhenitsyn turned out to be wrong about the strength of the communist threat. A decade later the Soviet Union collapsed, and the West emerged triumphant. But some of his statements about Western triviality and decadence seem as accurate as ever, and many of the concerns he expressed are echoed in this vol-
ume. Indeed, if anything they appear to have grown worse in the intervening decades.

Take this, for instance: “The defense of individual rights has reached such extremes as to make society as a whole defenseless against certain individuals.” Or this: “Hastiness and superficiality are the psychic disease of the twentieth century, and more than anywhere else this disease is reflected in the press.” Or this especially timely observation: “When a government starts an earnest fight against terrorism, public opinion immediately accuses it of violating the terrorists’ civil rights.”

Most of all, Solzhenitsyn was surely correct that many people will not sacrifice a fraction of their freedom, even in the defense of freedom. Instead they cling to their comforts and burrow deeper into the security of their domestic lives and personalized media bubbles. None of us is immune to this hobbitlike temptation, and real effort will be required even to make ourselves aware that threats to freedom still exist, let alone take responsibility for confronting them.

Yet despite the seriousness of the task, this is not a gloomy book. To the contrary, there is liveliness and engagement and optimism here. Above all, there is a spirit of resistance—and resistance gives us energy and purpose. Much as we admire the old Cold Warriors and seek to continue their struggle, we feel no need to emulate their sometimes grim sobriety. And just as the triumph of the West on largely material grounds suggests that “Western materialism” should be retired as a term of opprobrium, maybe we can also have a defense of freedom that is a little less apocalyptic and a little more hopeful, a little more fun.

I would even go further and suggest that we respond to the various new and old threats to freedom today not with fear and anxiety or by hunkering down in a defensive and critical crouch, but with an exuberant affirmation and assertion and expression of our freedom in as many dimensions as possible. This is something everyone can do, and it is not only the best use of our freedom but the best way we have of repaying the gift.
New Threats to Freedom
1

The Decline of
American Press Freedom

Anne Applebaum

In 1949, when George Orwell wrote his dystopian novel *1984*, he gave its hero, Winston Smith, a job at the Ministry of Truth. All day long, Winston clips politically unacceptable facts, stuffs them into little pneumatic tubes, and then pushes the tubes down a chute. Beside him sits a woman in charge of finding and erasing the names of people who have been “vaporized.” And their office, Orwell wrote, “with its fifty workers or thereabouts, was only one sub-section, a single cell, as it were, in the huge complexity of the Records Department.”

It’s odd to read *1984* in 2010, because it makes one realize that the politics of Orwell’s vision aren’t at all outdated. There are still plenty of governments in the world that go to extraordinary lengths to shape what their citizens read, think, and say, just like Orwell’s Big Brother. But the technology envisioned in *1984* is so—well—1980s. Paper? Pneumatic tubes? Nowadays, none of that is necessary: it can all be done electronically, or through telephone calls, or using commercial pressure. In the modern world, censorship can take many forms, even reaching across international boundaries. And it has already begun to affect the American press, and American publishing, far more than is commonly understood.

To see what I mean, look closely at a decision taken by Yale University Press in the summer of 2009. Deep in the month of August, its editors quietly issued a statement confirming that there would be a change to the content of one of their forthcoming books, *The Cartoons that Shook the World*. The book was a scholarly account of the
international controversy that followed a Danish newspaper’s 2005 publication of twelve cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed. The book contained a significant amount of new material. Among other things, the Danish author, Jytte Klausen, argued that the controversy had been manipulated by Danish imams who showed their followers false, sexually offensive depictions of Mohammed alongside the real ones, which were not inherently offensive at all.

She also argued that others—including the Egyptian government—used the cartoons to create “outrage” in the form of riots, boycotts, and anti-Danish protests, which they deployed for their own political ends. She consulted with several Muslim scholars who agreed that the protests were not evidence of authentic Muslim religious anger, but were rather political games. Later, she would write that she had “good reason” to believe that the publication of the cartoons need not have been interpreted offensively, and that republication of them by a scholarly press was not threatening or dangerous.

Nevertheless, the Yale press, “after careful consideration,” decided not to publish the cartoons. In a statement, the normally independent press declared that it had consulted Yale University, and that the university had in turn consulted “counterterrorism officials in the United States and in the United Kingdom, U.S. diplomats who had served as ambassadors in the Middle East, foreign ambassadors from Muslim countries, the top Muslim official at the United Nations, and senior scholars in Islamic studies.” To the intense disappointment of Klausen as well as of the book’s original editor—who had himself consulted lawyers and who supported printing the book—the university decided that the risk of terrorism was too great to allow the publication of the twelve cartoons.

Predictably, a minor controversy ensued. Some Yale alumni, myself included, signed a letter of protest. The New York Times and others printed angry criticism. But the university stuck to its decision, citing fears of violence and possible terrorist attacks on the Yale campus. John Negroponte, former CIA director, former ambassador to Baghdad, and class of ’60, even applauded the Yale press for its “brave” refusal to print the images.
Equally predictably, the story faded. But Yale’s decision to bow to pressure from unnamed and unknowable terrorists has further consequences. Although there was no direct threat—just a fear that someone, someday, might present one—the university has now set a standard for others. Yale’s press is one of the best in the country: if its editors won’t publish the Danish cartoons, why should anyone else? Indeed, one of Yale’s strongest and most frequently cited arguments for not publishing the cartoons was the fact that most major U.S. newspapers refused to publish them in 2005. Now the bar is higher: if not only the *New York Times*, not only the *Washington Post*, but even Yale University Press refuse to publish them, then that makes it much harder for anybody else to treat the cartoon controversy as a legitimate matter for scholarly and political debate.

But Yale’s decision was not an unusual one either. On the contrary, it is only one of a number of recent incidents that illustrate the increasing power of illiberal groups and regimes—not only Islamic terrorists but authoritarian foreign governments and the companies aligned with them—to place de facto controls on American publishers, newspapers, and media companies, constraining once-sacred American rights to free speech, and once-inviolable American traditions of press freedom.

Indeed, the vague threat of “terrorism” is only one tool that foreign entities use to control free speech, and it is not necessarily the most powerful. Yale’s decision attracted a good deal of attention, but in fact the university was merely cowardly. It thought it was acting in the interests of its students’ safety. By contrast, the motives of other Americans who have lately tried to suppress information on behalf of foreign entities are often murkier.

A case in point is another decision, also taken in the summer of 2009. At that time, *GQ* magazine was debating whether it should publish an article titled “Vladimir Putin’s Dark Rise to Power,” by Scott Anderson. The article, based on extensive reporting, argued that Russian security services had helped plan and execute a series of bomb explosions in Moscow in 2000. These explosions, which killed dozens of people, were blamed on Chechen terrorists. Subsequently,
then-Russian president Vladimir Putin also used the explosions as a justification for the launch of the second Chechen war.

So conveniently timed were these terrorist attacks, in fact, that even at the time many in Moscow suspected the secret services had a hand in them, and much circumstantial evidence is available to support this thesis. Nevertheless, in Russia, discussion of this evidence remains officially taboo. Obviously, if Russian special forces acting on the authority of the Russian president were involved in killing Russian citizens, this is a very controversial matter indeed.

Eventually, Anderson’s article making this case did appear in the September 2009 American edition of the magazine, but not anywhere else. Condé Nast, the U.S. media company that owns GQ, banned the article from appearing in the magazine’s Russian edition, banned it from appearing in other foreign editions, and banned it from appearing on any Condé Nast website. In addition, the company ordered all of its magazines and affiliates around the world—magazines such as the New Yorker and Wired, among others—to refrain from mentioning or promoting the article in any way. In an e-mail sent to senior editors and later quoted by National Public Radio, company lawyers even forbade company employees to physically carry the U.S. edition of the magazine into Russia or to show it to any Russian government officials, journalists, or advertisers.

Clearly, Condé Nast’s motives had nothing to do with security, and everything to do with Russian advertisers, many of whom are one way or another linked to the Russian government. And of course the company was made to look foolish: within days, Anderson’s article was scanned, translated, and published in English and Russian on multiple websites. But perhaps that didn’t matter. What Condé Nast seems to have wanted was to appear to be groveling before their Russian subscribers and advertisers.

In this, they succeeded. And, as in the case of Yale’s decision, Condé Nast’s humiliating act of self-censorship sets a precedent. If one of the largest and richest media companies in the country is not willing to take the chance of offending Putin, why should anyone else? The same, of course, is true for Russians: if American journal-
ists writing about Russia in American publications cannot feel confident that their work will be supported, why should Russians, who risk so much more, feel any braver? Ultimately, a tame, censored Russian press is a disaster for the American companies that work in Russia and Americans who live there, since such a press will not dare to expose the culture of corruption that makes doing business in Russia so difficult for foreigners. But clearly, Condé Nast wasn’t thinking that far down the line.

None of these flirtations with censorship compares, however, with the lengths to which American companies have been persuaded to go in aiding and abetting censorship in China. Once upon a time, visionaries predicted that, in the twenty-first century, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes would no longer be able to operate, so overwhelmed would they be by the flood of free information available on the Internet. China in particular was often cited as the perfect example, a place where free markets would bring free information that would ultimately destroy the communist regime.

If it hasn’t worked out that way, the fault lies partly in the decisions of some of America’s best-known media and software companies, many of which have collaborated with the Chinese government’s increasingly sophisticated Internet censorship regime for much of the past decade. In fact, the “Great Firewall,” the vast Chinese Internet filter, was originally created with the help of Cisco Systems, an American company. Among other things, Cisco provided the Chinese government with technology designed to block traffic to individual pages within a particular website, so that you can read about Tibet’s architectural heritage and never know you missed the description of the Dalai Lama at all. Cisco shows no remorse: in a 2005 interview, a company spokesman told me that this is the “same equipment technology that your local library uses to block pornography,” and besides, “We’re not doing anything illegal.”

Others have also complied. Since 2002, Yahoo! has been voluntarily controlling its own search engine in China. The company signed a “public pledge of self-discipline” when it entered the Chinese market, in exchange for being allowed to place its servers on
the Chinese mainland. At around the same time, Microsoft agreed to alter the Chinese version of its blog tool, MSN Spaces, at the behest of the Chinese government. In practice, this means that Chinese bloggers who try to post a forbidden word—“Tiananmen,” say, or “democracy”—receive a warning stating that “this message contains a banned expression, please delete.”

After much agonizing, mighty Google also joined them. The company had been operating a Chinese version of google.com, with U.S.-based servers, for many years. But the service was difficult for ordinary Chinese users to access, so in 2006, the company decided to launch Google.cn. In order to be allowed to do so, it too pledged to abide by Chinese rules on banned websites. Anywhere else in the world, type the name of “Falun Gong,” the banned Chinese spiritual movement, into Google, and thousands of results, chat rooms, and blogs turn up. On Google.cn, “Falun Gong” produces nothing.

What has been the result of this American compliance with Chinese edicts? Far from appeasing the regime, it appears to have emboldened the Chinese government to expand its censorship program. Pressure has been put on individual companies: in 2005, the Chinese government demanded that Yahoo! hand over the e-mail account information of a Chinese journalist who had leaked documents to a U.S.-based website—documents describing Chinese restrictions on media coverage of the fifteenth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square uprising. Yahoo! agreed to help; the journalist received a ten-year jail sentence for “leaking state secrets.”

At about the same time, the Chinese government also demanded that Microsoft delete the writings of a free-speech advocate from its blog software. Microsoft complied with this request also, even though the company’s servers are based in the United States. In other words, a Chinese government demand had forced an American company to change information on American servers based on American soil, possibly setting a precedent.

Since then, pressure has expanded over the system as a whole. Throughout 2009, U.S. sites such as YouTube (owned by Google) or Flickr (owned by Yahoo!) suddenly and inexplicably disappeared.
from Chinese servers, usually at a time when some politically sensitive event was taking place in China. (YouTube could not be viewed in China for many months, for example, after videos of Chinese soldiers beating Uighur demonstrators in the rebellious province of Xinjiang began to circulate on the service.)

More generalized harassment has also been directed at Google, which in the summer of 2009 was accused of “spreading pornography.” As a result, both of its sites, google.cn and google.com in Chinese, were completely blocked. Off the record, the company suspects that the real source of these accusations is its main Chinese competitor, Baidu, which of course benefits directly whenever Google suffers from technical difficulties. But in the murky and corrupt world of Chinese business and politics—made murkier and more corrupt by the lack of a completely free press—this accusation was difficult to prove.

In June 2009, the Chinese made an attempt to go even further. The government issued orders requiring all personal computers sold in the country to include a special form of filtering software, Green Dam, designed to filter out “unhealthy information” from the Internet. Allegedly aimed, once again, at “pornography,” the software would have allowed the government to access its citizens’ individual computers, preventing them from reading a constantly updated list of banned websites. It would also have allowed the government to monitor the browsing habits of individuals. “It’s like downloading spyware onto your computer,” one Hong Kong Internet expert explained, “but the government is the spy.”

Full of bugs, and liable to freeze screens, Green Dam would have made all personal computers more difficult to use in general. As if that were not enough, the time allotted to load the software onto new computers was very short—the original deadline gave manufacturers one month—which presented enormous technical problems to any hardware company selling in China. Nevertheless, two companies—Lenovo, based in China, and Acer, based in Taiwan—complied.

In this case, however, the U.S. companies—computer hardware
companies this time, and not merely makers of software and search engines—decided to fight back. Acting as a group, they went to the U.S. trade representative and the commerce secretary, who in turn protested to the Chinese government and threatened to take the issue to the World Trade Organization. After a few weeks, the Chinese government backed off. Although Green Dam remains mandatory in Chinese schools and in Internet cafes, personal computers are not forced to use it—at least not yet. But although that story ended more or less happily, it is worth pausing for a moment to imagine what would have happened had those U.S. companies not banded together, and had they not protested the Chinese government’s demands. The software would have been loaded; everyone in China would eventually be forced to use a computer containing government spyware; and the Chinese government would have been strengthened, once again, in its resolve to force foreign companies to collaborate in the mass censorship and limitations on free speech that it places on its own people. U.S. companies would have maintained their ability to sell in China, but over time might well have lost out to the Chinese companies, which are more willing to work closely with the Chinese government to get the results it wants.

And, in the winter of 2010, another crisis showed exactly how this can and will happen: in January, Google announced its intention to pull out of China altogether. The company said that it had been subject to an extraordinary series of cyber-attacks, aimed at entering and spying on the company’s servers—as well as gaining access to the email accounts of Chinese and Tibetan dissidents. The company decided to take a principled stand on the issue: its CEO, Eric Schmidt, told Newsweek that “this was not a business decision.” But, in fact, it was not clear whether Google’s announcement was made for moral reasons, or because Chinese cyberhacks threaten the company’s critical intellectual property—software codes, documents—as well as its reputation for security.

As of this writing, Google’s final decision had not been made, and the company said it was talking to the Chinese government. But the dramatic announcement, coupled with the “Green Dam” fiasco
do make one thing clear: large American companies still have the power and strength to challenge the Chinese government, at least when they act together—or at least when they have the size and strength of Google. As the cases of Yale University Press and Condé Nast well illustrate, smaller American companies no longer necessarily have this power, or at least they do not have the courage to find out whether they do. For the record, I note that weakness in the face of rich authoritarians is not an exclusively American trait: the Finnish company Nokia and the German company Siemens have sold cell phone monitoring and silencing equipment to the Iranian government. But the American corporate involvement in China is broader and deeper than that of almost any other country.

I don’t want to imply, by discussing all of these stories together, that they are exactly the same. Many nuances exist. Yale does seem to have agonized over its decision not to publish the cartoons; Google, too, has publicly agonized over how it should operate in China, and has argued in the past that at the very least the company can provide Chinese consumers with more information, if not complete information. Nevertheless, these stories do point, more generally, to something new: even a decade ago it would have been hard to imagine an American university press refusing to print something out of fear of foreign terrorism, or that a large and respectable American company would agree to participate in mass censorship at all.

Indeed, two decades ago, even three and four decades ago, the American press had a reputation for standing up to totalitarian regimes. Moscow correspondents for American newspapers regularly investigated, and then printed, stories that infuriated the governments of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, as a result, Eastern European dissidents sought out American correspondents. In 1972, New York Times correspondent Hedrick Smith and Washington Post correspondent Robert Kaiser conducted the historic first interview with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. In 1984, another New York Times correspondent hosted a party in Warsaw for Adam Michnik, one of the country’s most notorious dissidents, on the occasion of his release from jail. Their bosses knew about these escapades, and
approved: when Nick Daniloff, a correspondent for *U.S. News and World Report* was arrested and accused of spying in Moscow, the magazine retained former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as defense attorney; Daniloff remembers getting “great support” from Mortimer Zuckerman, the owner of the magazine. There was no suggestion of conforming to the demands of these totalitarian regimes. Why should there be?

But the world has changed, the financial power of illiberal regimes has grown, the reach of international terrorism stretches further than it once did, and globalization has some unexpected consequences. Among other things, globalization means that consumers of the luxury goods so expensively advertised in Condé Nast magazines increasingly do not live in the United States—hence, the company’s need to tailor its content to the tastes of the rich in Russia, China, the Gulf States, and other parts of the world that do not respect the rights of the free press or admire American traditions of investigative journalism. The kinds of pressures put on newspaper owners are much different from what they used to be.

This shift represents a major cultural change, and it is not one that a law or congressional resolution can correct. On the contrary, the only solution to the new threats to American press freedom lies in organized resistance, as in the case of the Chinese software edicts, and in the widening of debate on this growing threat. Talking and writing help, since many of these decisions are easy enough to justify on an individual basis. But companies confronted by the long-term consequences of their refusals to publish may eventually come to think differently. Sergey Brin, one of Google’s founders, said even before the 2010 announcement that it was “a mistake” for Google to enter China, partly because of the continued pressure the company has experienced, but also partly because of the negative consequences on Google’s image in its most important market, the United States. A company that once claimed its motto was “Don’t Be Evil” proved itself willing at least to dabble in some very evil practices—and, as it turned out, subjected itself to serious security threats as well.

Fortunately, still enough Americans were committed to the princi-
ple of free speech to point this out. The more these issues are debated and discussed, in the U.S. media as well as in Congress, the more likely that companies will think twice before making the wrong choices. Attacks on press freedom have always been best countered with more press freedom. That, at least, hasn’t yet changed.